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COMMENTS
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN TORT: WHO DO
THEY LIMIT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Statutes of limitation once played a more useful role in Wisconsin's legal
system than they do today. The purposes behind statutes of limitation are
"(1) [t]hat of discouraging stale and fraudulent claims, and (2) that of al-
lowing meritorious claimants, who have been as diligent as possible, an op-
portunity to seek redress for injuries sustained."1 Any person seeking relief
for injury was to have brought his claim within the time period stated in the
statute or be barred.2 However, the passage of new legislation3 and the
development of recent case law4 has dramatically altered these defense-ori-
ented statutes by construing them to allow recovery for nearly every
plaintiff.5
The issue of greatest concern regarding the decline in the effectiveness of
the statutes of limitation in tort is the application and expansion of the
1. Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 203 N.W.2d 699, 702 (1973) (footnote omitted). See
also Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986); Hansen v. A.H. Robins,
Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983); Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 291 N.W.2d 568
(1980). For a brief discussion of competing policy concerns, see Note, The Fairness and Constitu-
tionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1683 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality]; Ghiardi, Computing Time in Tort Statutes of
Limitation, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 575 (1980-8 1); Reeves & Hirsh, For Whom the Bell Tolls, 32 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 414 (1986); Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Stat-
utes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REv. 663 (1978); Note, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Is
Denied: Chardon v. Fumero Soto and Alice in Wonderland, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 686
(1985); Note, Reaffirming the Discovery Rule in Medical Malpractice Actions: Neagle v. Nelson,
28 S. TEx. L. REv. 139 (1987).
2. See Wis. STAT. § 330.205 (1961).
3. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
4. Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1980); Jaeger v. Raymark Indus., 610 F.
Supp. 784 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Reimer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 576 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.
Wis. 1983); Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Wis. 1981);
Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140; Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578.
5. Recently, Wisconsin Circuit Court Judge Ralph Adam Fine stated: "to wait for actual
maturation of the disease before starting the Statute of Limitations clock, would ... eliminate the
possibility of any Statute of Limitations defense irrespective of when the action was brought."
Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soe'y, Case No. 680-805 (1987) (emphasis in original).
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recently enacted "discovery rule.",6 Two of the main forces behind the ex-
pansion have been the influx in the number of insidious diseases7 and the
contemplation of a number of yet undiscovered latent diseases.,
As a result of recent decisions applying the discovery rule, the Wiscon-
sin courts have made no attempt to save any limiting effects of the statutes,
thus defeating their effectiveness as "statutes of limitation." One of the
most recent applications of the statutes in Wisconsin has prompted a need
for new legislation in order to recapture the spirit of the statute and apply it
justiciously to tort law.9
This Comment will trace the development of the Wisconsin statutes of
limitation in tort, review the corresponding changes in Wisconsin case law
and analyze the present and future problems associated with the discovery
rule within the statutes.1 In addition, this Comment will propose alterna-
tive solutions to the problems introduced in an effort to eliminate the confu-
sion and inconsistencies that plague the Wisconsin courts today.
II. BACKGROUND
A review of the present state of Wisconsin's statutes of limitation would
be superficial without analyzing the statutory and case law development in
the past few decades. It is through this development that one recognizes
how far our courts have strayed from the original purpose of the statute.
6. Beginning in the medical malpractice area, a growing number of judicial decisions and
legislative enactments exercised the use of the discovery rule, whereby the statute of limitation was
tolled until the injured party discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered his
injury. See Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968); Parker v. Vaughan, 124 Ga. App. 300, 183
S.E.2d 605 (1971); Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964); Mathis v.
Hejna, 109 Ill. App. 2d 356, 248 N.E.2d 767 (1969); Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 411
N.E.2d 458 (1980); Moran v. Napolitano, 71 N.J. 133, 363 A.2d 346 (1976); Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); Newberry v. Tarvin,
594 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).
The application of the discovery rule spread from doctors to dentists, accountants, architects,
lawyers and manufacturers of products proven to be defective. For a list of cases illustrating these
expansions, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 167 nn. 19-23 (5th ed.
1984).
7. An insidious disease is one which progresses with very few or no symptoms to indicate its
seriousness. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 776 (20th ed. 1961).
8. "[L]atent disease suits may shake the foundations of U.S. tort law, threaten the financial
health of insurance companies and some industries, and contribute to the nation's economic
problems." Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139, 139 (1981).
9. See Reimer, 576 F. Supp. 197; Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140; Hansen, 113
Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578.




Statutes of limitation were originally developed to protect defendants in
cases where the plaintiff was sitting on his claim until important evidence
was lost and witnesses disappeared. 1 Thus, the statutes attempted to ad-
dress equal policy concerns by ensuring prompt litigation of meritorious
claims and providing defendants with a tool to avoid stale and fraudulent
claims. 12
In 1963, "[a]n action to recover damages for injuries to the person for
such injuries sustained" was to be commenced within three years after the
cause of action accrued or be barred. 13 This statute applied to both per-
sonal injury and wrongful death actions. 4 At this time15 there were no
separate statutes designed to apply to medical malpractice actions.16 There
was, however, an extended six-year limitation period governing actions for
relief for fraud, 7 but this statute was held not to apply to negligence or
malpractice actions.' 8 The three-year statute remained virtually un-
changed 9 until 1980, when a new limitation of actions applicable to medi-
cal malpractice suits became effective.2" This statute provides:
(1) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an action to recover
damages for injury arising from any treatment or operation per-
formed by, or from any omission by, a person who is a health care
provider, regardless of the theory on which the action is based, shall
be commenced within the later of:
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or
(b) One year from the date the injury was discovered or, in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered, except that
11. For a brief discussion of the basic philosophy behind all statutes of limitation, see Reeves
& Hirsh, supra note 1, at 415.
12. Armes v. Kenosha County, 81 Wis. 2d 309, 260 N.W.2d 515 (1977).
13. Wis. STAT. § 330.205 (1963); see also Haase v. Sawicki, 20 Wis. 2d 308, 121 N.W.2d 876
(1963).
14. Wis. STAT. § 330.205(2) (1963).
15. Section 330.205 of the Wisconsin Statutes remained exactly the same, but was renum-
bered as 893.205 from 1957 through 1980.
16. There were, however, other statutes of limitation addressing such actions as libel, slander,
unpaid salary, and seduction.
17. Wis. STAT. § 330.19(7) (1963) provides: "Within 6 years: ... (7) An action for relief on
the ground of fraud. The cause of action in such case is not deemed to have accrued until the
discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud."
18. McCluskey v. Thranow, 31 Wis. 2d 245, 251, 142 N.W.2d 787, 790 (1966).
19. See supra note 15.
20. Section 893.55 of the Wisconsin Statutes was created under the laws of 1979, but subse-




an action may not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5
years from the date of the act or omission.
(2) If a health care provider conceals from a patient a prior act or
omission of the provider which has resulted in injury to the patient,
an action shall be commenced within one year from the date that the
patient discovers the concealment or, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered the concealment or within the
time limitation provided by sub. (1), whichever is later.
(3) When a foreign object which has no therapeutic or diagnostic
purpose or effect has been left in a patient's body, an action shall be
commenced within one year after the patient is aware or, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, should have been aware of the presence of
the object or within the time limitation provided by sub. (1), which-
ever is later.21
This section was designed to set forth precise time limits within which
an action to recover damages from medical malpractice must be com-
menced. 2 The first subsection addresses general time limits, requiring the
patient to commence action either within the general three-year period or
within one year from the date of discovery, whichever is later. It also pro-
vides an outer limit of five years from the time of the act or omission.23 The
second and third subsections, which are designed as exceptions to subsec-
tion one, allow for different time periods when confronted with fraudulent
concealment by a health care provider24 or a foreign object left in a patient's
body.
B. Changes in Wisconsin Case Law
The impact that the statutes have had upon various plaintiffs is best
illustrated by a review of Wisconsin case law.26 Although the pre-1980 stat-
21. Wis. STAT. § 893.55 (1983-84).
22. See id. at § 893.55 (1983-84) (Judicial Council Committee's Note).
23. Id. at § 893.55(1).
24. Id. at § 893.55(2).
25. Id. at 893.55(3). The most logical explanation for this universally adopted foreign object
exception is that there is little or no chance of fraudulent claims. Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987
(Me. 1982). There is, however, a wide divergence among courts as to what objects are considered
foreign. Compare Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 F. Supp. 1392 (D.N.H. 1976) (pill-like foreign
object) with Fonda v. Paulsen, 79 Misc. 2d 936, 361 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1974) (cancer not a foreign
object) and Le Vine v. Isoserve, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 747, 334 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1972) (radioactive
isotope is a foreign object).
The basis of section 893.205 of the Wisconsin Statutes was not eliminated upon the enactment
of section 893.55, but was renumbered section 983.54 and amended to eliminate language now
covered by Section 893.07 (covering the application of foreign statutes of limitation).
26. For a summary of Wisconsin case law, see Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388
N.W.2d 140 (1986) and Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
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utes were increasingly criticized by the time they were modified,27 they were
consistently applied.28 On the other hand, the 1980 statutory reform cre-
ated a host of questions that have been, and continue to be, contemplated
by the courts.29
1. Pre-Discovery
The Wisconsin legislature has provided that statutes of limitation begin
to run at the time when the cause of action accrues.3" Furthermore, there
has been general agreement among the courts that a cause of action accrues
"where there exists a claim capable of present enforcement, a suable party
against whom it may be enforced, and a party who has a present right to
enforce it."31 But as to the different causes of action available, the more
difficult question becomes when did the plaintiff's first opportunity to act
upon the claim occur? A cause of action in tort could accrue at three differ-
ent points in time: (1) the time of the negligent act or omission, (2) the time
of injury, or (3) the time of discovery of the injury.32 In determining at
what point the cause of action would accrue, the court examines the ele-
ments of the cause of action. A claim capable of enforcement requires that
all of the necessary elements of a cause of action exist.33 Since damages are
27. See Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980) (denial of recovery in a
medical malpractice action for severance of plaintiff's vasa during a hernia operation); Peterson v.
Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 203 N.W.2d 699 (1973) (denial of recovery in a medical malpractice action
against the representatives of a deceased physician who, during a gall bladder operation, allegedly
failed to remove the cystic duct and also left a piece of gauze within plaintiff's abdomen); Holifield
v. Setco Indus., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969) (denial of recovery in a products action
after decedent was fatally injured by flying parts of a grinding machine which had been purchased
10 years prior to the injury).
28. See, eg., Rod, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 291 N.W.2d 568; Pulchinski v. Strnad, 88 Wis. 2d 423, 276
N.W.2d 781 (1979); Peterson, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 203 N.W.2d 699; Olson v. St. Croix Valley Memorial
Hosp., 55 Wis. 2d 628, 201 N.W.2d 63 (1972); Holifield, 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177; Mc-
Cluskey, 31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787; Haase, 20 Wis. 2d 308, 121 N.W.2d 876; Barry v.
Minahan, 127 Wis. 570, 107 N.W. 488 (1906).
29. See Peterson, 57 Wis. 2d at 9-17, 203 N.W.2d at 703-07 (what is an injury?); Ghiardi,
supra note 1, at 576-86 (when does a cause of action accrue?); Reeves & Hirsh, supra note 1, at
416-27 (what is discovery?).
30. Wis. STAT. § 893.04 (1979-80).
31. Barry, 127 Wis. at 573, 107 N.W. at 490 (citations omitted). Accord Borello, 130 Wis. 2d
at 419, 388 N.W.2d at 149; Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 554, 335 N.W.2d at 580; Rod, 96 Wis. 2d at
352, 291 N.W.2d at 569-70; Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 96
Wis. 2d 3!4, 323, 291 N.W.2d 825, 830 (1980) (citations omitted); Holifield, 42 Wis. 2d at 754,
168 N.W.2d at 179.
32. Holifield, 42 Wis. 2d at 759, 168 N.W.2d at 182; see also Ghiardi, supra note 1, at 576-77.
33. For a discussion of the necessary elements for a negligence claim, see Holifield, 42 Wis. 2d
750, 168 N.W.2d 177.
It is the fact and date of injury that sets in force and operation the factors that create
and establish the basis for a claim of damages. It is true that, without an act of negligence,
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an essential element of a tort,34 Wisconsin courts adopted the time of injury
as the point of accrual.
Prior to 1980, the Wisconsin courts refused to depart from the time of
injury point of accrual in personal injury cases. In McCluskey v. Thranow,35
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was asked to adopt the discovery rule for a
man who suffered from the presence of an eight-inch hemostat in his abdo-
men as a result of a negligently performed splenectomy. The court con-
cluded that "this question is not open to new adjudication in Wisconsin,"36
since the legislature previously had the opportunity to create a statutory
discovery rule but consciously refused to do so.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court adhered strictly to the statutes
of limitation, dissenting voices suggested alternatives.37 Justice Hallows,
dissenting in Peterson v. Roloff,38 recognized the questions left unanswered
by the statutes of limitation in tort:
In every tort action there must be at least three elements - the
negligent act or breach of duty, the causation, and an injury which is
recognizable in money damages. Until the injury occurs, no harm is
done and there is nothing to be compensated for; therefore, there is
no cause of action for damages....
Since injury is necessary to establish a cause of action, the ques-
tion becomes, what is an injury and when does an injury in a mal-
practice case occur?39
The question concerning injury becomes increasingly important when ana-
lyzing cases where the negligent act or omission is not simultaneous with a
no claim for damages based on negligence can arise. It is likewise true that, without the
result of injury, no claim for damages based on negligence can be asserted, or at least
successfully asserted. Both the act of negligence and the fact of resultant injury must take
place before [a] cause of action founded on negligence can be said to have accrued.
Id. at 756, 168 N.W.2d at 180.
34. See Rod, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 291 N.W.2d 568; Holifield, 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177.
35. 31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966).
36. Id. at 250-51, 142 N.W.2d at 790 (footnote omitted). Likewise, the court exercised judi-
cial restraint and refused to consider adopting the discovery rule in Olson v. St. Croix Valley
Memorial Hosp., 55 Wis. 2d 628, 201 N.W.2d 63 (1972) (where plaintiff was given a blood trans-
fusion of the wrong type, the court held that the cause of action accrued at the time of the
transfusion and not seven years later when her child was born dead) and Reistad v. Manz, 11 Wis.
2d 155, 105 N.W.2d 324 (1960) (court refused to adopt the discovery rule for plaintiff's medical
malpractice action, brought 20 years after doctors left guaze in his abdomen). For a review of
jurisdictions that did apply the discovery rule at that time, see Note, Statute of Limitations -
Professional Negligence - Foreign Objects Left in Patient's Body, 17 VAND. L. REv. 1577 (1964).
37. See Rod, 96 Wis. 2d at 360-61, 291 N.W.2d at 573-74 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); Peter-
son, 57 Wis. 2d at 7-17, 203 N.W.2d at 702-07 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
38. 57 Wis. 2d 1, 7-17, 203 N.W.2d 699, 702-07 (1973).
39. Id. at 8-9, 203 N.W.2d at 703 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
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cognizable injury; namely medical malpractice and products liability
cases.' It was not until the courts became flooded with such cases that the
problems involved became evident and a search for solutions began.
The problems raised an interesting argument regarding the statutes of
limitation in tort. In Rod v. Farrell,41 the plaintiff suggested that the statute
applied at the time 2 violated his constitutional rights "to a certain remedy
in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, or character. ' 43 Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
this constitutional challenge to be invalid,' a number of other jurisdictions
attacked their rigid statutes of limitation on a constitutional basis. 45
Courts have also attacked rigid statutes of limitation on the basis of
public policy. An innocent victim's recovery should not be barred when the
victim does not know, or have reason to believe, he has been injured in any
way. Likewise, a negligent actor should not be preferred over an innocent
victim.46 These challenges prompted the introduction of a surge of session
bills in the legislature 7 and a search for alternatives to avoid the harshness
of the statutes.48
2. Development of the Discovery Rule
The rigid application of the statutes often resulted in illogical decisions.
The illogic and injustice caused by the rigid application of the statutes of
limitation in medical malpractice and product liability cases led one judge
to write:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived,
or be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never
planted, or burn down a house never built, or miss a train running
40. Compare Rod, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 291 N.W.2d 568 (medical malpractice "delayed injury");
Peterson, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 203 N.W.2d 699 (medical malpractice "foreign object") with Reimer v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 576 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (products liability "asbes-
tos"); Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (products liability "IUD").
41. 96 Wis. 2d 349, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980).
42. Wis. STAT. § 893.205 (1971). It is interesting to note that just two months after this case
was decided, Section 893.55 became effective.
43. WIs. CONST. art. I, § 9.
44. Rod, 96 Wis. 2d at 356, 291 N.W.2d at 571. Although the court held that "a statute of
limitations might offend Art. I, sec. 9, Wisconsin Constitution, if it extinguished a claim of a
potential plaintiff before that plaintiff suffered an injury," the plaintiff in this case was found to
have been injured on the day the negligence occurred. Id.
45. See Note, For Want of a Nail: The Discovery Rule in Medical Malpractice Cases, 27 ARIZ.
L. REV. 265, 265-67 (1985) [hereinafter For Want of a Nail]; Note, The Fairness and Constitution-
ality, supra note 1, at 1692-702.
46. Peterson, 57 Wis. 2d at 12, 203 N.W.2d at 705 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
47. Rod, 96 Wis. 2d at 354 n.6, 291 N.W.2d at 570 n.6.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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on a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has
always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal "axiom," that a
statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action
before that cause of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is
available to the plaintiff.4 9
As a result of legislative inaction, many courts have attempted to modify
the effect of the statutes through alternative solutions such as: applying
contract law which applies a longer statute of limitation than tort law;
50
applying the continuous treatment doctrine where the statute of limitation
does not commence until doctor-patient relationship terminates; 5I applying
the fraudulent concealment theory which tolls the statute until discovery
when a physician has concealed his malpractice; 2 and adopting the discov-
ery rule in cases where the plaintiff is unable to recognize his injury. 3 Re-
cent decisions by the Wisconsin courts, however, have rendered the statutes
of limitation virtually ineffective.
By 1973, over one-half of the states had adopted some form of a discov-
ery rule,54 either by statute55 or by judicial interpretation.56 Wisconsin
49. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
50. See Baum v. Turel, 206 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Giambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn.
380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940); Suskey v. Davidoff, 2 Wis. 2d 503, 87 N.W.2d 306 (1958); Klingbeil v.
Saucerman, 165 Wis. 60, 160 N.W. 1051 (1917).
51. See Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 1982); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo.
603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 452
N.Y.S.2d 351 (1982); Lomber v. Farrow, 91 A.D.2d 725, 457 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1982); Samuelson v.
Freeman, 75 Wash. 2d 894, 454 P.2d 406 (1969). See generally Reeves & Hirsh, supra note 1, at
423-24 for an overview of the continuous treatment rule.
52. See Allen v. Layton, 235 A.2d 261 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Eschenbacher v. Hier, 363
Mich. 676, 110 N.W.2d 731 (1961); Rothman v. Silber, 90 N.J. Super. 22, 216 A.2d 18 (1966);
Krestich v. Stefanez, 243 Wis. 1, 9 N.W.2d 130 (1943). Contra Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 A.D. 313,
218 N.Y.S. 139 (1926). The Supreme Court of New York subsequently held that failure to dis-
close a negligent act constituted malpractice in Kleinman v. Lack, 6 A.D.2d 1046, 179 N.Y.S.2d
194 (1958).
53. See Puro v. Henry, 188 Conn. 301, 449 A.2d 176 (1982); Childers v. Tauber, 148 Ga.
App. 157, 250 S.E.2d 787 (1978); Stoner v. Carr, 97 Idaho 641, 550 P.2d 259 (1976); Cutsinger v.
Cullinan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 527, 391 N.E.2d 177 (1979); Hepp v. Pierce, 460 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984); Myrick, 444 A.2d 987 (Me. 1982); Ross v. Kansas City Gen. Hosp. & Medical
Center, 608 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1980); Fox v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 135 N.J. Super. 108, 342 A.2d
859 (1975); Ooft v. City of New York, 104 Misc. 2d 879, 429 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1980); Adams v.
Sherk, 4 Ohio St. 3d 37, 446 N.E.2d 165 (1983); Keating v. Zemel, 281 Pa. Super. 129, 421 A.2d
1181 (1980).
54. See Comment, Medical Malpractice-Statute of Limitations Tolled Until Patient Can Rea-
sonably Discover Foreign Object Negligently Left in His Body During Surgery, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 244,
250 n.30 (1971-72).
55. See ALA. CODE § 25(1) (Supp. 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (1958); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 83, sec. 22.1 (1965); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.110(4) (1967).
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courts continued to reject the discovery rule, not in distaste for the rule, but
rather because the courts maintained that amendment must originate
within the legislature. Nevertheless, the legislature remained inactive until
the courts made it clear that if the legislature was not going to act, the
courts would:
"We closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we
can likewise open them." Our courts should be alive to the demands
of justice. Here, the legislature has not defined accrual of a cause of
action and this case calls for the exercise of our judicial duty to in-
terpret the statutory language "after the cause of action has ac-
crued" so as to offer reasonable protection to the innocent victim of
medical malpractice. 7
Shortly thereafter, in 1980, the Wisconsin legislature opened its own
doors and enacted the new medical malpractice statute, which included the
discovery rule.58 Although the legislature considered and rejected a discov-
ery rule which would apply to all types of personal injury actions,5 9 a short
time later the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co.,"
expanded the application of the discovery rule to all tort actions.61 In Han-
sen, Justice Callow reasoned that there are other tort actions, which closely
resemble medical malpractice, whereby the plaintiff is unaware of his injury
at the time of the negligent act or omission. These cases should not be
ignored simply because the negligent actor was a manufacturer of a product
rather than a health care provider.62 The full impact of this expansion is
56. See Owens v. Brochher, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970); Renner v. Edwards, 93
Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970); Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hasp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248
N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968);
Janisch v. Mullins, 1 Wash. App. 393, 461 P.2d 895 (1969); Morgan v. Grace Hasp., Inc., 149 W.
Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
57. Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 16-17, 203 N.W.2d 699, 707 (1973) (Hallows, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting in part Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hasp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162,
178, 260 P.2d 765, 774 (1953)).
58. See supra text accompanying note 21.
59. The 1979 Assembly Bill 327 would have provided in part: "an action to recover injuries
to the person shall be commenced within three years after the person injured discovers the injury
or reasonably should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, or be barred."
60. 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 136-42 for a
summary of Hansen.
61. Id. "The notion that a tort claim (other than medical malpractice) accrues when the
injury is discovered or is reasonably discoverable is not completely foreign to Wisconsin law. We
recently took a step in this direction in Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Con-
struction." Id. at 557-58, 388 N.W.2d at 581 (citation omitted).
62. See Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55,
81-83 (1978-79); see generally Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 554-61, 335 N.W.2d at 580-83.
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unknown, but the case of Borello v. US. Oil Co.63 indicates areas of conflict
in the very near future.
In Borello, the plaintiff suffered from metal fume fever due to a defective
furnace.' Within the same month that the furnace was installed, Ms.
Borello wrote to the company that installed the furnace stating: .'[m]y
nose burns, makes me dizzy, headaches are bad and now my chest even
hurts. It seems there is a lack of oxygen and I keep opening the win-
dows.",' 65 One could argue that Ms. Borello discovered her injury at the
time of the letter, thus putting the statute of limitation in motion and even-
tually barring her claim. Nonetheless, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that Ms. Borello's discovery of the injury itself was not sufficient to toll the
statute.66 The court further expanded the discovery rule67 requiring not
only the discovery of the injury, but also the "cause" of the injury. 68 The
reasons given by the court were two-fold: first, because of "a legislatively
approved pattern of the discovery rule" in worker's compensation cases69
and second, because of the injustice involved in barring a claimant's action
before he is aware of such right to action.7°
In the wake of Hansen and Borello, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has
had the opportunity to apply the judicially created discovery rule71 to a
medical malpractice cause of action.72 In Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. , the plaintiff was rendered sterile during a hydrocele sur-
63. 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986).
64. Id. Metal fume fever is caused by exposure to a significant amount of metal oxides and
carbon monoxide, resulting in severe headaches and nausea. Id. at 402-03, 388 N.W.2d at 142.
65. Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 400, 388 N.W.2d at 141.
66. Id. at 409, 388 N.W.2d at 145.
67. The Borello court did not consider the decision as an expansion of Hansen:
It is apparent from the general tenor of Hansen that this court did not, by the language
"claims shall accrue on the date the injury is discovered," mean the date on which manifes-
tations of the injury shall first appear .... Hence, Hansen stands for the proposition that
the cause of action does not accrue in a malpractice action until the nature of the injury
was, or reasonably ought to have been, known to the claimant.
Id. at 408-09, 388 N.W.2d at 144-45 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 411, 388 N.W.2d at 146.
69. Section 102.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that the statute of limitation does not
commence until the employee "knew or ought to have known the nature of his or her disability
and its relation to the employment." Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 406, 388 N.W.2d at 143 (emphasis
added).
70. Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 403-04, 388 N.W.2d at 142-43.
71. The judicially created rule is the discovery rule denounced in Hansen, which is more
broadly applied than 893.55.





gery shortly after his birth in 1961. 74 The former three-year limitations
statute75 was in effect at the time of the plaintiff's injury, yet the court held
that the cause of action did not accrue until the claim was discovered in
1983.76 In doing so, the court ruled Wisconsin Statute Section 893.55 un-
constitutional as to these specific circumstances and applied the .Borello dis-
covery rule instead.77
It is not difficult to predict the conflicts and discrepancies that are apt to
plague the courts in the very near future.78 An analysis of the questions,
arising out of Hansen and Borello in particular, will serve to promote
awareness in an effort for legislative and judicial change in the application
of the discovery rule in personal injury cases.
III. ANALYSIS
Most courts have abandoned the common law rule that the statutes of
limitation commence at the time of the negligent act or omission" unless
the accompanying injury results and is recognized simultaneously.80 This
rule is grounded upon statutory language and public policy. Since a cause
of action accrues when there exists a claim capable of enforcement,"' it only
follows that both the act giving rise to the injury and the resultant injury
itself must exist prior to the commencement of the statutes of limitation.82
Although this rule is consistently applied among the courts today,83 incon-
74. Id. at 82, 410 N.W.2d at 586. "A segment of his epididymis, the structure wherein sperm
is stored, was apparently accidentally removed during the operation. He first discovered his in-
jury when, as a married man some twenty-two years later, he sought medical advice for a sus-
pected fertility problem." Id. at 82-83, 410 N.W.2d at 586.
75. Wis. STAT. § 330.205 (1959).
76. Kohnke, 140 Wis. 2d at 86, 410 N.W.2d at 588.
77. The appeals court stated:
Under this statute, because a medical malpractice action may never be commenced
more than five years from the act or omission, Brian's claim would have been barred as of
October 16, 1966. This is nearly fourteen years before the statute was adopted, and more
than seventeen years before the injury was discovered. That result is unacceptable because
it violates art. I, see. 9, of the Wisconsin Constitution ....
Our decision holds only that sec. 893.55 is void as applied to the peculiar facts of this
case.
Id. at 88-89, 410 N.W.2d at 588.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 142-61.
79. See McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product
Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416 (1981) (survey of statutes of limitation in
various states).
80. See Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp:. The Discovery Rule in Products Liability
Cases, 13 FORUM 279, 281 (1977-78).
81. See supra note 31.
82. Holifield v. Setco Indus., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 756, 168 N.W.2d 177, 180 (1969).
83. See supra note 31.
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sistency plagues the courts when the issue concerns the definitions of "in-
jury"84 and "discovery. "'85
A. What Is An "Injury?"
The discovery rule provides that "a claim does not accrue until the in-
jury is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should be dis-
covered."86 Until the injury occurs, there is no cause of action for
damages.87 Thus the question often arises, what is an injury?88 In most
tort cases this question causes no problem, but complications exist among
the growing number of delayed injury cases.89 Although different torts pro-
duce a variety of injuries and concerns, a single definition for "injury"
would provide the courts with a definite standard which would ultimately
produce the most equitable and uniform results.
1. Medical Malpractice: The "Foreign Object" Illustration
The clearest example of the problem in defining an "injury" is in con-
junction with "foreign object" medical malpractice cases. 90 Some courts
84. See Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 203 N.W.2d 699 (1973). See also McDaniel v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 542 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. II. 1982); Reimer v. Owens-Coming Fiber-
glass Corp., 576 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 504
F. Supp. 1210 (ED. Wis. 1981); Olsen v. Bell Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 388 Mass. 171, 445 N.E.2d
609 (1983); Myles v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 9 Ohio App. 3d 257, 459 N.E.2d 620 (1983);
Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986); Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113
Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
85. See Call v. Kezirian, 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982); Reis v. Cox, 104
Idaho 434, 660 P.2d 46 (1982); Wigginton v. Reichold Chems., Inc., 133 Il. App. 2d 776, 274
N.E.2d 118 (1971); McCarroll v. Doctors Gen. Hosp., 664 P.2d 382 (Okla. 1983); Borello, 130
Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140; Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578; Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis.
2d 349, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980).
86. Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 556, 335 N.W.2d at 581.
87. Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 96 Wis. 2d 314, 324,
291 N.W.2d 825, 830 (1980) (quoting Holifield, 42 Wis. 2d at 756, 168 N.W.2d at 180).
88. Peterson, 57 Wis. 2d at 9, 203 N.W.2d at 703 (Hallows, C. J., dissenting). For cases that
describe an injury, see supra note 84.
89. The reason for this difference is that in product liability cases, there are a number of
possible time periods that one could consider an injury to have occurred:
[W]hen the potential plaintiff first comes into contact with the chemical, drug, or pollutant
which causes the harm .... [W]hen the first symptoms of the disease or injury manifest
themselves .... [W]hen the potential plaintiff first discovered or reasonably should have
discovered that the disease resulted from plaintiff's use of defendant's defective product.
Birnbaum, supra note 80, at 281.
90. See Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794 (Del. 1968); Parker v. Vaughan, 124 Ga. App. 300,
183 S.E.2d 605 (1971); Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964);
Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969);
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979); Peterson, 57 Wis. 2d 1, 203 N.W.2d 699.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
argue that: "an injury occurs when a foreign object is left in the body of a
patient, even though neither the surgeon nor the patient knew of the forgot-
ten foreign object and other than the presence of the foreign object ... no
disability, disease or pain resulted."91
This definition is clear on its face but fails to consider the grave conse-
quences facing an individual who has no knowledge that the object exists in
their body. Until that object causes some adverse affect, the injured party
may be incapable of recognizing his injury.92 As a result, the discovery rule
was adopted and applied to medical malpractice cases.93 Even though the
statute fails to define an injury, the policy reasons which support the use of
the discovery rule indicate that an injury does not occur until discovery is
made.94
2. Products Liability: The Asbestos Illustration
In most products liability cases, damages are immediately apparent at
the time of the injury, therefore, there is no problem discovering when an
injury has occurred.95 Problems arise when the use of a product is unac-
companied by a perceptible injury. 96 Two major scenarios have developed
in this category: (1) when a single tort produces a latent injury which is
discoverable at a later date97 and (2) when a single or multiple tort produces
a series of latent injuries.98 This first situation is quite similar to the "for-
eign object" medical malpractice case and therefore it is unnecessary to
comment on it.99 It is the second situation that has caused the most con-
cern in pinpointing a time of injury.
Asbestos cases, for example, often involve a number of injuries resulting
from the same harmful exposure." Two of the most common diseases as-
91. Peterson, 57 Wis. 2d at 9, 203 N.W.2d at 703 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 11-12, 203 N.W.2d at 704-05.
93. See supra text accompanying note 21.
94. See Ghiardi, supra note 1, at 577-79.
95. Neubauer, 504 F. Supp. at 1213. See also Holifield, 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177.
96. See generally For Want of a Nail, supra note 45; Note, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp. and Statutes of Limitations in Latent Injury Litigation: An Equitable Expansion of the
Discovery Rule, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 471 (1982-83) [hereinafter Latent Injury Litigation]; Birn-
baum, supra note 80.
97. See, e.g., Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
98. See, e.g., Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Wis.
1981).
99. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
100. "[A]sbestosis and mesothelioma are progressive diseases caused by prolonged exposure
to asbestos dust .... There also appears to be no dispute that a tendency toward pneumonia,
shortness of breath, wheezing, pleural calcification, and pulmonary disfunction may be sympto-
matic of asbestos-caused disease." Neubauer, 504 F. Supp. at 1212. See also Urie v. Thompson,
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sociated with asbestos insulation are asbestosis' 0 ' and mesothelioma. 10 2
The question ultimately becomes whether the injury occurs at the first
symptoms of the first disease or upon the manifestation of the subsequent
disease. 103 One court properly recognized that "[tihere is rarely a magic
moment when one exposed to asbestos can be said to have contracted asbes-
tosis; the exposure is more in the nature of a continuing tort.""° Therefore,
the injuries caused by asbestos are to be considered as one and the adverse
affects test can be applied.
Asbestos litigation poses an additional problem regarding diagnosis.
More often than not, the first symptoms accompanying an asbestos-related
injury are chest pains and shortness of breath."0 5 Furthermore, the first
medically demonstrable sign is a cloudy spot on the lung. 106 All of these
signs are synonymous with a number of cancer-related diseases, which ulti-
mately turns our attention to the "cause" of the injury. 107
The statutes of limitation should not commence until the injured party
has reasonable belief of the cause of his injury.'0 8 As such, the plaintiff has
a duty to monitor his disease and commence action as soon as it is reason-
ably possible. The injured party's method of contact with the asbestos mate-
rial could also play a very significant role.109 Some commentators insist
337 U.S. 163 (1949) (silicosis); Ricciuti v. Voltare Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960) (beryl-
liosis); Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113
(1979) (asbestosis); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (ma-
lignant mesothelioma).
101. "Asbestosis is a progressive, irreversible lung disease caused by the inhalation of asbestos
fibers." Latent Injury Litigation, supra note 96, at 472 n.8 (citing STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 128 (5th unabr. law. ed. (1972)).
102. "Mesothelioma is a cancer of the mesothelial cells which line the chest walls and sur-
round the organs of the chest cavity. It is an extremely rare form of cancer, offers a poor progno-
sis for recovery, and is usually fatal." Id. at 472-73 n.9 (citing Stedman's Medical Dictionary 861
(5th unabr. law. ed. (1972)).
103. For example, asbestosis involves a three-stage process: the time of initial exposure, when
harm is done but the disease is undetectable; the time of discovery, when x-rays could detect the
disease; and the time of manifestation, when the victim would notice the effects of the disease.
Comment, Asbestosis- Who Will Pay the Plaintiff?, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1491, 1509 (1983).
104. Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975).
105. See ROBBINS, COTRAN & KUMAR, PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE 761 (3d ed. 1984).
See also Milwaukee J., Feb. 16, 1987, at D 1.
106. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1082-83 (5th Cir. 1973).
107. For example, DES, a drug taken by women to prevent miscarriages, has been linked
to causing cancer in some of the female offspring of the mothers who used the drug. TRIS,
a chemical used to make cloth flame retardant, has been banned by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission because of its carcenogenic effect.
Birnbaum, supra note 80, at 285 n.26.
108. Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140.
109. Virtually every urban dweller is exposed to small amounts of asbestos dust in the air
because it is so widely used in innumerable products, e.g., sewage and water conduits,
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that for years, insulators and pipe line employees have been aware of the
dangerous effects of asbestos materials and, as a result, they should have a
reasonable belief that their physical condition was caused from inhaling as-
bestos fibers as opposed to another environmental condition.'10 In contrast,
a school teacher who is exposed to asbestos insulation in a more distant
fashion might not be able to predict the cause of his plight.
Despite the additional individual analysis required for latent injury
cases, the adverse affects test proves to be universally useful. The test re-
quires affirmative duties on the part of the plaintiff in an attempt to restore
the original purpose of the statutes of limitation.
B. What is "Discovery?"
Many jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, have defined the term "discov-
ery" in various ways," resulting in confusion in the application of the dis-
covery rule.' 12 Many cases define "discovery" as the discovery of injury,1 3
while others include discovery of the cause of injury in their definition. 4
Nevertheless, the inconsistency of definitions within a single state produces
substantially different outcomes for each party. 1 s
1. Definitions of "Discovery"
One interpretation of the word "discovery" suggests that there is no
reason to toll the statute if the plaintiff is aware that he has suffered some
flooring and roofing products, insulation, brake linings, clutch casings, and coating com-
pounds. Even water supplies and foods become contaminated by the airborne pollution.
ROBBINS, COTRAN & KUMAR, PATHOLOGIC BASIs OF DISEASE 438 (3d ed. 1984).
110. If knowledge of the disease, the symptoms, and the causes are widespread among per-
sons in the same or similar occupation as the plaintiff, then that plaintiff ought to recognize his
condition and seek immediate medical assistance.
111. See Myles, 9 Ohio App. 3d 257, 459 N.E.2d 620 (discovery of injury by competent medi-
cal authority); Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (discovery of injury and cause of injury);
Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (discovery of injury).
112. Compare Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 with Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388
N.W.2d 140. Similarly, New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Kenison stated:
"One might read several discovery rule cases and conclude that the courts are applying
two substantively distinct rules. In most cases the courts frame the rule in terms of the
plaintiff's discovery of the causal relationship between his injury and the defendant's con-
duct. In some cases... a court will simply state that, under the discovery rule, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his injury. Still other
courts use both statements of the rule within the same case."
Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 409-10, 388 N.W.2d at 145 (citing Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H.
164, 170-71, 371 A.2d 170, 174 (1977) (citation omitted)).
113. See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 111.
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injury.' 16 Thus, for example, when a person is injured while using a partic-
ular defective product or becomes ill after consuming a tainted beverage,
the statute of limitation commences at the time of injury or illness and not
upon the discovery of the product's defectiveness. The policy underlying
this theory is that the injured party has a duty to proceed with due diligence
in making his claim since the plaintiff became aware of his right to sue at
the time of injury. 17 Most critics of this theory of subjective self-diagnosis
are concerned with the diagnostic abilities of the average plaintiff in cases
involving progressive and insidious diseases." 8
The objective medical diagnosis theory is premised upon the belief that
an injured party could not possibly be expected to make a self-diagnosis of a
progressive disease. 19 In jurisdictions adhering to this interpretation of the
term "discovery," the statutes of limitation begin to run at the time the
plaintiff is informed of the injury by a physician. 120 At least one jurisdiction
limits this approach in an effort to avoid tolling the statutes of limitation in
cases where the injured party neglects to seek medical care.' The court, in
Johnson v. Koppers Co.,' 22 safeguarded the rule by stating that a cause of
action accrues either upon the date that the injured person is informed by
competent medical authority or upon the date on which the injured person
should have become aware that he had been injured.12 3
Perhaps the most litigated interpretation of the discovery rule states that
the statute does not commence until the injured party is aware of the injury
and the cause of such injury. 124 Problems evolve in cases where the injury
and the discovery of the causal relationship do not occur simultaneously. ' 25
Some courts justify this theory based on the nature of progressive and insid-
116. See Lofton v. General Motors Corp., 694 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Illinois
law); Friends Univ. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 227 Kan. 559, 608 P.2d 936 (1980).
117. See Bates v. Little Co. of St. Mary Hosp., 108 Ill. App. 3d 137, 438 N.E.2d 1250 (1982).
118. Examples of progressive diseases are: asbestosis, mesothelioma, berylliosis, silicosis and
pulmonary carcinoma.
119. See Bradt v. United States, 221 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1955); Myles, 9 Ohio App. 3d 257, 459
N.E.2d 620; Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140.
120. Adherence to this interpretation becomes questionable in light of Borello, where three
physicians supposedly misdiagnosed the plaintiff's condition. Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 401, 388
N.W.2d at 141.
121. See, eg., Johnson v. Koppers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Myles, 9 Ohio
App. 3d 257, 459 N.E.2d 620.
122. 524 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
123. Id.
124. See Fearson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 525 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1981); Grabowski
v. Turner & Newall, 516 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 324
Pa. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984); Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140.
125. See supra note 91.
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ious disease, arguing that a standard discovery rule 126 often bars the injured
party's claim shortly after the injury is discovered but before the party has
any indication of the cause of injury.'2 7 There is little fear that these plain-
tiffs are "sleeping on their rights," merely because of the latent character of
the harm suffered and the difficulties involved in identifying the cause of
harm.
Some courts extend this theory even further by delaying the commence-
ment of the statute until the plaintiff discovers the legally responsible
party.'28 The rationale for this extension is that a defendant should not
escape recourse for tortious conduct simply because the defendant's identity
is difficult to discover.'29 This extension is capable of causing confusion, for
it could conceivably be interpreted as requiring both knowledge of the re-
sponsible party and awareness of the existence of a legal cause of action.
Nevertheless, this rule has not yet received general acceptance since most
courts have disregarded the plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of his harm. 3 0
2. Wisconsin's Present Definition of "Discovery"
The definition of discovery has been in dispute since the legislative en-
actment of the discovery rule.'31 However, the leading Wisconsin case'32 in
the area of discovery failed to provide future parties with any determination
as to "what" the plaintiff must discover to start the statutes of limitation
running. The court in Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co. 33 simply stated that "a
claim does not accrue until the injury is discovered or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should be discovered"' 34 and that this rule was
adopted "for all tort actions other than those already governed by a legisla-
tively created discovery rule."' 35 At first glance, one might conclude that
the statute commences immediately upon discovery of the illness or injury.
126. For the rule that defines "discovery" as discovery of injury, see supra note 116.
127. Cancer is the disease that best illustrates the need for developing this theory of discov-
ery. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
128. Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979). See
also Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 778, 392
N.E.2d 1352 (1979).
129. See Reynolds, Statute of Limitations Problems in Products Liability Cases Exercises in
Privity, Symmetry, and Repose, 38 OKLA. L. Rav. 667, 673 (1985).
130. However, two jurisdictions do not toll the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discov-
ers his legal cause of action. See Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973); S.C. CoDF
ANN. § 15-3-535 (Law. Co-op. 1985 Supp.).
131. Wis. STAT. § 893.55 (1979-80).
132. Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
133. 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
134. Id. at 556, 335 N.W.2d at 581.
135. Id. at 560, 335 N.W.2d at 583.
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A review of the facts in Hansen, however, casts doubt and confusion on the
validity of this conclusion.
Hansen involved a woman who brought suit against A.H. Robins. 136 In
1974, the plaintiff had been fitted with a Dalkon Shield intrauterine device,
known as an IUD.'3 7 Four years later the plaintiff became aware of vari-
ous alarming symptoms and consulted a physician soon thereafter. 138 That
physician concluded that her symptoms were probably not due to pelvic
inflammatory disease (PID) 139 but rather resulted from gastroenteritis. 14°
After subsequent examination by another physician, her condition was di-
agnosed as PID14 ' and the statute began running. The facts in Hansen are
significant when reviewing the court's decision. Since the plaintiff's discov-
ery of her injury and the cause of her injury were simultaneous, 142 there was
no need for the court to expand upon the definition of discovery to obtain a
result in favor of the plaintiff.
The uncertainty surrounding the definition of "discovery" has contin-
ued. In a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Borello v. U.S. Oil
Co., 143 the plaintiff became ill immediately after the defendant installed a
furnace in her home. Thereafter she subjectively concluded her symptoms
were the result of the bad odor which was emitted from the furnace. 144 The
plaintiff immediately sought medical assistance from various physicians
who concluded that her illness "could not, with any degree of probability,
be attributed to the furnace."' 145 It was not until her examination by a
fourth doctor that her original self-diagnosis was confirmed as "metal fume
fever"' 146 caused by the furnace.'
47
The Borello court interpreted Hansen in light of its facts and concluded
that:
136. Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578.
137. "An intrauterine device (IUD) is a contraceptive device which fits within the uterus. It
is made of plastic or metal and has a tail string which extends through the cervical canal and into
the vagina." Id. at 552 n.2, 335 N.W.2d at 579 n.2.
138. Id. at 552-53, 335 N.W.2d at 579.
139. "Pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) is caused by the presence of bacteria in the uterus."
Id. at 552 n.3., 335 N.W.2d at 579 n.3.
140. Gastroenteritis is the inflamation of the stomach and intestine, usually due to an infec-
tion by virus or bacteria. BANTOM MEDICAL DICTIONARY 170 (1981).
141. Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 553, 335 N.W.2d at 579. PID is a pelvic inflammatory disease
caused by bacteria in the uterus. Id. at 552 n.3, 335 N.W.2d at 579 n.3.
142. Id.
143. 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986).
144. Id. at 400-01, 388 N.W.2d at 141.
145. Id. at 401, 388 N.W.2d at 141.
146. See supra note 64.
147. Borello, at 403-04, 388 N.W.2d at 142.
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Under the law enunciated by Hansen, most claims will accrue at the
time of the negligent act or injury simply because, in the typical tort,
all the elements of an enforceable claim are apparent at approxi-
mately that time - the negligent act, the injury, its nature, the cause
of injury, and the identity of the defendant. "Discovery" in most
cases is implicit in the circumstances immediately surrounding the
original misconduct. 4
As a result of this interpretation, the court had no trouble justifying the
expansion of the definition of discovery to include a determination of
"cause." In fact, the Borello court did not consider the decision as an ex-
pansion of Hansen in this respect; this interpretation was implied in Han-
sen.'49 If this natural transition exists between Hansen and Borello, it is
interesting to review a recent federal district court case, decided shortly
before Borello. The court in Jaeger v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 150 held that
since the Hansen decision was clear on its face, there was no reason to ex-
tend the discovery rule to require discovery of the cause of injury.'5 1
IV. FEAR OF FUTURE PROBLEMS AND EXPANSIONS
In the wake of Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co.152 and Borello v. U.S. Oil
Co., I" a number of questions remain, causing difficulties for individuals and
corporations relying on the statutes of limitation. Although the statute has
almost been expanded to its limit, due to the discovery rule, some crucial
issues remain undecided.
Fortunately, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has ruled in Kempfer v.
Evers"5 4 that knowledge of the legal right to bring suit is not necessary to
start statutes of limitation running. Clearly Wisconsin has refused to ex-
tend the discovery rule that far. However, both Hansen and Borello leave
behind additional concerns regarding medical diagnosis and the complete-
ness of claims. Both plaintiffs in Hansen and in Borello unfortunately fell
victim to a number of physicians, who were unable to diagnose their inju-
ries, prior to the determinative examinations by their respective doctors.' 55
This repeated situation prompts one to inquire whether the area of medical
competency will eventually find its way into the definition of discovery.
148. Id. at 404-05 n.2, 388 N.W.2d at 143 n.2.
149. Id. at 409, 388 N.W.2d at 145.
150. 610 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
151. Id. at 788.
152. 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
153. 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986).
154. 133 Wis. 2d 415, 395 N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1986).
155. See Borello, 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140; Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d
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Will a plaintiff be capable of tolling the statute before he has located a "suf-
ficiently competent" physician, that is, one likely to testify in accordance
with the plaintiff's original self-diagnosis? In effect, this is what happened
with respect to each of the plaintiffs in Hansen and Borello.15
6
Similarly, one wonders just how definite or complete a claim must be to
render it sufficient to toll the statute. The present interpretation of the dis-
covery rule, as stated in Borello, suggests that the statute of limitation com-
mences once the plaintiff discovers his injury and the cause of that injury.'57
An interesting situation exists when considering the cause element. To
what degree of certainty must a cause of injury be decided? Consider this
hypothetical: A woman subjectively believed her disease to be metal fume
fever caused by her furnace, and this diagnosis was confirmed by one of the
physicians she visited. However, another physician diagnosed her condi-
tion as asbestosis resulting from asbestos fibers in her insulation. Suppose
this woman brought suit against the manufacturer of the furnace and the
jury sided for the defendant. Could the plaintiff then initiate a negligence
suit against the asbestos manufacturer based on the other physician's deter-
mination of cause? The elements of negligence: duty, breach, cause and
harm, 58 are to be proven by the plaintiff, but it is the jury who ultimately
decides whether the necessary causal connection exists.' 59
Finally, the present state of the statutes of limitation, specifically in la-
tent disease claims, is in danger of losing its original purpose. 160 Since
many of these diseases develop slowly and sometimes inconspicuously,
many plaintiffs wait a number of years for the maturation of the disease in
order to commence action.16 Such a practice, however, eliminates the stat-
utes of limitation defense.
V. NEED FOR RESPONSE
It is obvious from the influx in litigation over the statutes of limitation
that some legislative or judicial response is necessary to preserve the effec-
tiveness of the statutes. It is conceded that an increase in the number of
156. Id.
157. Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 411, 388 N.W.2d at 146.
158. See, e.g., Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980).
159. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp. v. Royal Transit Co., 29 Wis. 2d 620, 130
N.W.2d 595 (1966).
160. See Reimer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 576 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Wis. 1983). See
also Comment, supra note 103; Birnbaum, supra note 80.
161. "In some cases, asbestosis may become manifest within 10 years of the date of initial
exposure. In general, asbestos manifests itself between 10 and 25 years after initial exposure.




latent and insidious disease claims in the product liability field demanded a
change in the application of the statutes.62 Unfortunately, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in an effort to compensate one plaintiff who suffered from
such a disease, expanded the statute to reach all tort actions.16 3  The
breadth of such expansion was damaging to the effectiveness of the statutes
of limitation; thus, an effort must be made, either legislatively or judicially,
to restore meaning to the statute.
A. Legislative Change
The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated: "[s]uch arguments, pro and con,
as to what limitations on bringing to court actions based on products liabil-
ity and negligent manufacture will best serve the public interest are for the
legislature, not the courts, to consider."' 6 The legislature is by far the
body most capable of making these determinations. It has greater resources
and can establish committees to study these questions and weigh competing
concerns. Yet the courts have failed to present any suggestions to the legis-
lature even though it is in the best position to witness the effectiveness of
laws.' 6
5
One of the more widely used methods of limiting the discovery rule
involves the placement of an outer time limit on various tort claims render-
ing a hardship to defendants.1 66 These "statutes of repose" generally com-
mence at an earlier date than other statutes and end after a longer time
period. 67 They represent a "return to the traditional form of time-bar stat-
utes, even if they purport to mitigate the inequity of traditional statutes of
limitations by extending the period during which a litigant may bring
suit.,', 68 The constitutionality of statutes of repose have often been chal-
162. See supra note 160.
163. Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
164. Holifield v. Setco Indus., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 758, 168 N.W.2d 177, 181 (1969).
165. See Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980); Peterson v. Roloff, 57 Wis.
2d 1, 203 N.W.2d 699 (1973); Holifield, 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177; Reistad v. Manz, 11
Wis. 2d 155, 105 N.W.2d 324 (1960).
166. See Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L.
REv. 627 (1985) for a discussion of the use of statutes of repose.
167. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 168 (5th ed. 1984)
General negligence statutes of limitations for personal injury range in duration from 1-
6 years, typically 2, 3 or 4 years, depending on the state. See, eg., CCH Prod. Liab. Rep.
3420. Repose statutes typically range in length, for medical malpractice: 2-6 years; archi-
tect-contractor cases: 4-10 years; products liability: 6-12 years.
Id., § 30, at 168 n.31.
168. Fairness and Constitutionality, supra note 45, at 1683.
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lenged, 169 resulting in the abolition of such statutes in several states 170 in-
cluding Wisconsin.' 71
Since a reenactment of the statutes of repose is unlikely, alternative so-
lutions must be found. One such alternative is reformation of the statutes
of limitation by including separate statutes for different torts. This would
alleviate the present problem of the progressive expansion of one statute to
meet the needs of each type of tort.1 72 Under this approach the legislature
would adopt a longer period in which a plaintiff, who suffered from the
effects of a latent or insidious disease due to a defective product, could bring
a product action. Conversely, a shorter period would suffice for tort claims
in which the plaintiff suffered immediate noticeable harm. Although this
approach may be the most effective way to treat tort claims, such major
legislative reform would be slow to develop.
Perhaps the easiest legislative change would be to revise Wisconsin Stat-
ute Section 893.54 to include the discovery rule, in effect codifying the deci-
sion of Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co.. 17 3 Additionally, sections 893.54 and
938.55 could be reworded to define "discovery" as the point in time when
the injured party subjectively discovers the injury or in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence, should have discovered the injury. This legislative defini-
tion would eliminate the confusion caused by the many different judicially
developed definitions 174 and emphasize the importance of the injured
party's obligation of due diligence in pursuing his claim. 175 In all fairness, if
a manufacturer is responsible for taking all necessary precautions to insure
that a product is safe, then a party plaintiff should also pursue a potential
claim with the same diligence. This is not to say that an average citizen
should be capable of making the complex diagnosis involved with many
product cases. On the contrary, this statute of limitation would commence
upon the initial discovery of an injury in an effort to provoke the injured
169. See Barwick v. Celatex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984); Wayne v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984); Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504
(8th Cir. 1983); Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983); Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66
Or. App. 541, 674 P.2d 1194 (1984).
170. See Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241
S.E.2d 739 (1978); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980).
171. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 168 n.34 (5th ed. 1984).
172. See, e.g., Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578.
173. 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
174. See Jaeger v. Raymark Indus., 610 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Reimer v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglass Corp., 576 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d
397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986); Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578.
175. Keep in mind that the discovery rule does include the language "in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence." WIs. STAT. § 893.55(l)(b) (1979-80).
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party to seek medical assistanc at the earliest time possible. Punishing
those individuals who "sit on their rights" would restore the original pur-
pose of the statutes of limitation, a purpose that was virtually destroyed in
Borello v. U.S. Oil Co.176
The proposed reform would not jeopardize the claim for those individu-
als who suffer from a progressive type disease or injury. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has held that fear of future adverse medical consequences is
a compensable injury."17 Furthermore, even the fact that a physician is un-
able to state to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the feared
consequence will occur is of no significance at all. 7 s
Prompt litigation means prompt notice to the negligent defendant,
which could have a major impact on the treatment of the injury and on the
number of future claims. Plaintiffs would be forced to seek medical assist-
ance at an early time, thus increasing their chances for effective treatment
of present injuries and the alleviation of possible future effects. Addition-
ally, once a defendant is aware of a pending lawsuit, that party has the
opportunity to take immediate action to investigate the allegations and take
action to reduce the possibility of future claims. To hold that the statute
does not begin to run until diagnosis is made, which could conceivably be
twenty-five to forty years in the future, "I would discourage prompt investi-
gation and litigation, thus thwarting the purpose for modem day discovery.
B. Judicial Support
It would be unrealistic to believe that legislative change would be imme-
diate. Therefore, judicial support is needed in the interim to enhance the
effectiveness of the proposed reform. A test focusing on the plaintiff's duty
to use reasonable diligence would be in line with statutory change.
Under a due diligence test, the plaintiff would be required to use reason-
able diligence to adequately inform himself of the facts and circumstances
upon which the claim is based.'8 0 Mistake and ignorance would play no
part in this test. Once the plaintiff became aware of facts that would put
him on notice of a possible claim, the statute would begin to run. The requi-
site notice would be "notice sufficient to excite attention and put a potential
plaintiff on his guard and call for further inquiry."'' A careful and diligent
176. 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986).
177. Branter v. Jenson, 121 Wis. 2d 658, 360 N.W.2d 529 (1985).
178. Id.
179. ROBBINS, COTRAN & KUMAR, PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE 760 (3d ed. 1984).
180. See, e.g., Anthony v. Koppers Co., 496 Pa. 119, 436 A.2d 181 (1981).




application of this test, by the courts, would manifest just and consistent
results until legislative reform could occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
Statutes of limitation reflect the policy of protecting defendants from
stale and fraudulent claims. The application of the statutes does not depend
upon the existence of a stale or fraudulent claim, but rather upon the
number of years specified in the applicable statute.1 82
Recent Wisconsin case law has expanded the discovery rule, taking it
outside of its statutory boundaries. This expansion has prompted the need
for new legislation and judicial restraint in an attempt to restore consistency
to Wisconsin case law. The proposed change is not intended to eliminate
the policy of allowing meritorious claimants an opportunity to recover for
their injuries. Rather, a greater emphasis will be placed on the plaintiff to
exemplify due diligence in seeking his claim.
Statutes of limitation weigh conflicting public policies. As a result, some
plaintiffs will be denied recovery regardless of the severity of their injury.
CHRISTINE M. BENSON
182. See Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986); Hansen v. A.H.
Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).
[Vol. 71:769
